Founder interview · Perspective

An interview with
Paul Fenton

On the thesis behind BidEquity, the economics of participation, and why pursuit needs to be treated as a capital allocation discipline.

April 2026  ·  Seven-minute read

£0.8bn-£1.0bn
Estimated annual public-sector pursuit activity across the UK's 37 largest strategic suppliers
~70%
Estimated share sunk on unsuccessful bids
Human-approved
AI assembles, tests and challenges. Experienced people decide.
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01 — Origin

What led you to start BidEquity?

After two decades personally running major programme pursuits across Defence, Emergency Services, Justice, and central government — including the Emergency Services Network (ESN), Royal Navy Project Selborne, the Ministry of Justice's electronic tagging programme, and Transport for London's Cycle Hire scheme — one pattern became impossible to ignore.

Founder-reported experience. The named programme involvement is founder-reported; programme context is a matter of public record. More on the About page.

The system is far less effective than people are willing to admit.

Organisations were deploying significant cost, time, and senior attention into pursuits — often without a clear view of whether those contracts were winnable in the first place.

What stood out wasn't just the inefficiency. It was the tolerance of it.

In any other part of the business, this level of investment would be challenged. In competitive pursuit, it's normalised.

At some point, the question becomes unavoidable: if we applied the same discipline here as we do elsewhere, how much of this activity would we actually continue?

The answer is: significantly less.

02 — The problem

What problem are you really solving?

This is not a pursuit problem. It's not even primarily a growth problem.

It's a capital allocation failure — with wider consequences.

The UK's 37 largest strategic suppliers spend an estimated £0.8bn-£1.0bn a year on public-sector pursuit activity, including the bids they lose. Around 70% is sunk on unsuccessful bids.

Evidence note
Read the public methodology for the corrected range, source distinctions and dated assumptions.

Yet that spend continues, largely unchallenged, because accountability is diffused, success is episodic, and failure is absorbed.

The result is a system that rewards participation over performance.

But there's a second layer to this. The cost of competing doesn't just create inefficiency. It shapes the market itself.

"This is not a pursuit problem. It is not even primarily a growth problem. It is a capital allocation failure — with wider consequences."

03 — Market dynamics

How does the cost of competing affect the market?

At the scale of major government programmes, the cost of mounting a credible pursuit is significant.

For established suppliers, that cost is absorbed as part of the operating model.

For challengers, it's a constraint.

Which means that, over time, the market tends to concentrate — not necessarily because incumbents are always better, but because they are better positioned to absorb the cost of competing repeatedly.

In practice, that leads to fewer credible challengers sustaining participation at scale, less diversity of approach in later-stage competition, and reduced competitive tension over time.

This isn't about procurement rules or intent.

It's about the economics of participation.

And that's rarely addressed directly.

04 — Common failure

What do most organisations get wrong?

They optimise for activity, not outcomes.

More pipeline. More pursuits. More effort.

But the reality is: a significant proportion of pursuits were never winnable. Effort is applied too late to materially change outcomes. And every pursuit is treated as a one-off rather than part of a system.

There's also a structural bias toward optimism.

Teams want pursuits to be winnable. Leadership wants growth. So weak opportunities progress further than they should.

By the time decisions are challenged, most of the cost has already been incurred.

The result is predictable: high cost, inconsistent performance, and very limited learning.

05 — Differentiation

How is BidEquity different?

Most approaches focus on improving the output — the proposal.

We focus on fixing the system that determines which pursuits should exist, how advantage is created early, and how consistently the organisation applies its best thinking.

The original interview captured the founding thesis. The current, approved platform boundary and five independent offerings are set out on the Platform and Solutions pages.

For the founder's current experience, evidence status and three-sided vantage, read About BidEquity.

"A bid is an investment. Equity is the return it should earn."

06 — Technology

Where does AI actually add value?

AI is not the differentiator. It's the enabler.

The platform is AI-enabled, not AI-led. The real shift is from a process that is fragmented, person-dependent, and inconsistent to one that is structured, repeatable, and intelligence-led.

AI allows us to standardise analysis, accelerate early-stage thinking, and reduce the volume of low-value effort.

But the value is not speed.

It's consistency — and better decisions earlier in the process.

07 — Current public boundary

Where to read the current public position

Perspective and About BidEquity.

08 — Challengers

What does this mean for challenger suppliers?

It changes the economics of entry.

If you reduce the cost of competing and improve how opportunities are selected, you reduce the risk associated with participation.

That allows organisations to compete selectively but credibly, sustain investment across multiple pursuits, and enter markets they would previously have avoided.

In effect, it becomes possible to compete more effectively without the same level of sunk cost.

09 — Broader impact

Why does that matter more broadly?

Because competition is not just about process — it's about participation.

If the cost of participating at scale is too high, markets tend to concentrate over time.

Not by design, but by economics.

Improving how suppliers compete has a wider effect: stronger participation, clearer differentiation, and more robust competitive outcomes.

That benefits both suppliers and the public sector.

"Competition is not just about process. It is about participation."

10 — Audience

Who is this really for?

This is for organisations where competing for revenue is central to growth — and where the cost of competing is material.

Typically: consultancies, technology and digital providers, BPO and outsourcing firms.

Especially those operating in complex, high-value public sector environments.

In those contexts, small changes in how you compete have disproportionate impact.

11 — Ambition

What's the long-term ambition?

To change how organisations think about competing.

From an accepted cost of doing business — to a managed, disciplined investment system.

And in doing so, to contribute to a more effective and competitive market overall.

12 — Closing

Final thought

There is a widely accepted inefficiency in how organisations compete for major contracts.

It persists because it's familiar, not because it's effective.

And it has consequences beyond individual firms — it shapes who is able to compete in the first place.

Most organisations will continue to tolerate it.

A smaller number will decide to change it.

Those are the organisations we work with.

"Most organisations will continue to tolerate it. A smaller number will decide to change it. Those are the organisations we work with."

If the argument lands, get in touch.

Twenty years of major programme pursuit execution, applied to your next opportunity. No commitment.

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